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### BY JUNIUS,

Author of "THE CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY," and other Tracts of 1840.

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CITY OF WASHINGTON, MARCH 4, 1843.

WE, the undersigned, impressed with a conviction of the importance and effectiveness of Tracts, as a means of informing the people in matters appertaining to our national interests, and of the suitable qualifications of JUNIUS, author of "THE CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY," and of other papers emanating from his pen, in view of the wide circulation and great usefulness of which, at that time, are well known to the public, hereby express the hope, that he may be able to renew his labors of the same kind for the coming contest of 1844; and we earnestly recommend to our Whig friends, and to Whig Associations throughout the Union, to second his efforts, if undertaken.

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NOTICE.—In compliance with the above recommendation, the Author of this Tract proposes, if occasion should seem to require, to publish several of the same kind, on the political questions of the time. The responsibilities involved in the undertaking make it necessary to maintain the privilege of *copyright*. Republication, therefore, in newspapers, or in other forms, is forbidden. The Tracts can be had, in any part of the Union, through the agency of Booksellers generally; or from those above named; or by remittances, with orders, *direct*, on the publishers.



## THE TWENTY-SEVENTH (WHIG) CONGRESS.

*Its position.*

It was a singular one in history—perfectly so in the annals of this country. The Government had been for a long time in the hands of their political opponents, till a once prosperous nation had been reduced to an extremity of misfortune, and rose at last to demand a change in public policy. With a majority unparalleled, the Whigs came into power, and a suffering people looked to them for relief. It was fair they should, for it had been promised, though the expectations of immediate result were doubtless unreasonable.

*The first inauspicious blow.*

None can deny that the death of their Chieftain was an astounding event. It was striking the sun from the political heaven.

*The second blow.*

The constitutional successor was little known, altogether untried, and was never expected to be called to that place. Diffidence towards him was the first state of feeling; concern the next; which ended in utter and hopeless disappointment. All know how that turned out; and we need not dwell on the painful history.

*An unforeseen result.*

In the constitution of our Government, the Executive occupies a commanding position in relation to the other branches. It seems never to have been anticipated, that he could be opposed to the legislature appointed by the same constituency, nor would such an event occur, if good faith in these high relations could at all times be relied on. It is manifest, however, that an Executive, not acting in harmony with the legislative branch of the Government, but opposing it, is a derangement of the machinery as to its intended operation. His power is sufficient to paralyze legislation, and to nullify any system of policy aimed to be established by legislative functions.

*A thing to be considered.*

Since it has been discovered, that the second on the Presidential ticket of 1840, who succeeded as principal by the death of the Chief, is *not* the man he was taken for, but utterly opposed to the great and leading principles of the party that raised him to power—if he has any principles at all—*it must be considered*, that the legislative branch of the Government, the majority of whom were *true* to those principles, were rendered powerless as to that system of policy that was designed to be established by the political revolution of 1840.

*The question to be tried.*

It will follow, therefore, that the 27th Congress cannot fairly be put on trial for not having done impossibilities, but only for what they *could* do and *have* done, under the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed, to redeem the pledges by which they were bound.

*The difficulties of the Whig Congress.*

In the grave of General Harrison was buried the Whig administration. Could any one expect, that the effects of many years misrule could be repaired in *thirty days*? There was not time to begin to do it, before the adverse winds of Executive power were blowing strong against the tide of reform. Treason was hatched, and began to peep and strut abroad, before the successor of the Fallen had been in his seat ten days.

*Another difficulty.*

The expectations of the nation were great, and the people demanded relief speedily, earlier than in any case it could possibly be obtained. A country which for an eighth of a century had been operated upon by causes of ruin, till it was prostrate, could not be raised again suddenly.

*Another.*

Nor was it possible for Congress alone to do the work, against a plotting, sub-

verting, thwarting, and opposing Executive. They were paralyzed, and their power of restoring public prosperity was stricken down. Even their investigating committees, whose functions were designed to ferret out corruption, were met at the threshold of their undertaking by the agents and abettors of corruption, who held in their hands the keys of the knowledge that was sought for, and whom the Executive still retained in their places, thus refusing to furnish the necessary facilities of reform. Deep and large as the fountains of corruption that have been laid open, are, it is believed that most of them, by this cause, yet lie concealed.

#### *The difficulties encountered on the currency question.*

All know that this was the question on which the country had been wrecked: that it was the *great* question. And all know with what patience, self-torture, and self-innolation, the Whigs of the 27th Congress waded through the Extra Session, struggling with ceaseless though useless endeavour, to save the party and the country from such unexampled perfidy. Giving up half, or more than half, and trying in every possible way to surmount the doom that was cast in their face, *once, twice*, were their large concessions baffled by the arbitrary interposition of the veto power. What they could, they *attempted*; what they could, they *did*.

“Who does the best his circumstance allows,  
Does well, acts nobly, angels could no more.”

#### *The Exchequer.*

And why did not the Whigs of the 27th Congress adopt that? Can it have been forgotten, with what argument and eloquence the vices and tendencies of the Subtreasury, political and other, were denounced by the Whigs in the campaign of 1840, and how their reasons prevailed with the people? Is it not in equally vivid remembrance, that the Subtreasury was repealed by popular demand and acclamation, as conceded by its friends and advocates? But the Whigs believe, and have demonstrated, in the report of the Committee of Ways and Means, contemporaneous with the vote of 193 to 18, which sealed the doom of the Exchequer—in that document they have *demonstrated*, that it has all the vices of the Subtreasury, and many more to boot; that it is the most hideous government bank scheme that could well be conceived; that, if carried into effect, it would enhance Executive power to an extent hazardous to liberty; and that, in the hands of an unprincipled, aspiring Executive, of strong and influential character, it might be seized upon for the overthrow of all liberty, and for the establishment of despotism. It is futile to rely on the power of repeal, when the whole history of our Government shows, that the Executive will can defeat any movement in the form of legislation. The people cannot contend against this “fixed Constitutional fact,” except by a revolution; and the only safe way is to keep out of its power.

The Whigs, with good reason and sound argument, had denounced the Subtreasury as a Government Bank in embryo, while it was in the process of incubation, and opposed it as such when it was hatched, and *because* it was such—*because*, confessedly, it provided a good currency for office-holders, *but for them only*, and left a bad currency for the people. How, then, could they, in the face of such facts, and in fealty to the principles avowed by them in 1840—principles so often and so widely promulgated, and still maintained—how could they adopt the *same* institution—*identically* the same, except that it was presented in a perfect stage of maturity, and therefore in its most objectionable form?

#### *But what is a Government Bank?*

It is Government stepping aside from its appropriate functions, and setting up in trade; for banking is nothing more or less than trading in money. It is, so far, laying aside the proper uses of Government, and usurping the rights of citizens—commercial rights. A Government managing banking concerns, is a Commercial Factory. No Government ever went into trade, in money or any thing else, without injury to the rights of citizens; or with gain to itself, except in the augmentation of its power, which is always its object. It is sure to sacrifice the commercial capital invested.

#### *The insurmountable objection.*

It is a very important point of difference, that a Government Bank has *no Master*,

because it is a part of Government, and an arm of its power; whereas all other banks have a Master *in* the Government. A national Government Bank, to answer the purpose of such an institution, aims to regulate and control the currency of the country, and in doing that, it---that is, the Government---brings within its power, to deal with at pleasure, every possible commercial or trading interest of the country, from that of banking in general, down to the vocation of a grinder of knives or a retailer of brickdust. It would be a supreme commercial power, in the hands of the supreme political power, controlled by none, but controlling all, itself master in trade, and master of the authorities under which all trade is carried on. This is the sort of thing which the 27th Congress rejected---*spurned*, as in duty bound, if they would respect themselves, and have the respect of the American people.

#### THE EXTRAVAGANCE AND CORRUPTION OF THE LATE ADMINISTRATION.

WE begin with Congress, where reform in Government must first begin, if it begins at all. The people will doubtless be astonished at the extravagancies of this body for a few years past, in the administration of its own internal economy, and at the corruption practised and tolerated in its own bosom. Could a body, practising such things, and conniving at such things, be expected to institute reform for other departments of the government?

#### *Cost of the printing, binding, engraving, and lithographing of Congress.*

This is, in any case, a large item of expense. The subject had been under investigation for two or three years, having been started by the Whigs while in the minority, and in 1842 much information appeared in the form of Congressional reports, to which we are indebted for the following results:

It was found upon investigation, that the average annual expenses, under the above general head, were \$261,459, and that the average annual saving under the new system, proposed and recommended by the Committees, would be \$132,761; and consequently, that the average annual unnecessary expense, or *waste*, in this item, is equal to this saving, viz. \$132,761. (See Senate Doc. No. 332, 2d Sess. 27th Congress.) In other words, the waste is 50 per cent. on the cost. That is to say, the Government not only permitted such extravagance to grow up in its own domicile, not only tolerated it for a long succession of years, but sanctioned it by solemn acts of legislation, to provide for it.

#### *Contingent expenses of Congress.*

This is an atrocious item in the history of the past, and shows how little dependance could be placed in a national legislature for general economy and purity, that would be guilty of such a lack of both these useful qualities in the management of their own household.

The custom of supplying members of Congress with stationery, &c., or the custom of members voting themselves a supply out of the people's money, on a *reasonable* scale, might not be very objectionable. It would be thought mean to oppose it, though when well paid, they might as well afford to provide for themselves as the people do in their own case. But the extent of wasteful prodigality to which this custom at last arrived, will no doubt awaken some surprise in the minds of the people who paid for it all, and whose private habits of economy in such matters, are somewhat different.

For stationery used by the 25th Congress, the first under Mr. Van Buren, we find such items as the following in the report of one of the Committees on retrenchment (by Mr. Summers), 2d Session, 27th Congress, House Doc. No. 39:

For 3,079 reams envelope paper, - - - - -	\$12,603 25	For wafers, - - - - -	\$1,332 01
" 3,610 do. quarto post, - - - - -	21,059 25	" ink, 15 barrels, - - - - -	528 50
" 2,316 do. foolscap, - - - - -	9,951 25	" inkstands, - - - - -	921 00
" 172 do. note, - - - - -	1,559 50	" seals, - - - - -	1,080 00
" 493 gross of steel pens, - - - - -	4,569 39	" pencils, - - - - -	562 00
" 83,700 quills, - - - - -	3,953 12	" folders, - - - - -	615 00
" making of pens, - - - - -	448 00	" twine, - - - - -	312 72
" scaling-wax, - - - - -	3,931 62	" 1,197 memorandum books, - - - - -	746 87
" tape, - - - - -	2,739 30		
" 106 doz. penknives, - - - - -	2,602 60	Total, - - - - -	\$69,514 78



Which, divided among 242 members of the House, shows, that the cost for stationery, for each member of the 25th Congress, for a period usually about nine months, was \$287.25.

How much is the average annual cost to professional men, lawyers, for example, for the above-named articles of stationery? The writer of this Tract thinks his occasions for these may perhaps be equal to those of a member of Congress, and he believes they do not cost him over \$20 a year—for nine months \$15—which leaves \$272.25 for each member of the House of Representatives, in the 25th Congress, unaccounted for to the people—in all \$65,881.78—a pretty round sum of waste for one branch of the national legislature, on the above-named articles.

How many penknives did they use severally? Divide 106 dozen, or 1272, by 242, and we have the answer thus— $5\frac{6}{10}$ . The average price of these penknives, it will be seen, was \$2.04 and a fraction each, which, of course, makes a bill of a little less than \$12, to supply each member of the 25th Congress in penknives for nine months. His sealing-wax cost somewhat over \$16; his quarto post paper, \$80 and some cents; and so on.—We leave the rest with the curious.

We suppose the excessive price of these articles results in the same way, by which the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the same Congress, Mr. Garland, contracted with a favorite of the President, Editor of "The Democratic Review," to furnish stationery to the amount of \$25,000, whereon the said favorite cleared a profit of \$7,000 to himself, *over and above a fair profit in trade*, as was proved and reported to the 27th Congress. In this way, of course, a penknife, which, in a fair market, costs \$1.50, would cost the people over \$2; and so with all the other articles. But when there happen to be two intermediate agents, each to make an *extra* profit of  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. on the same articles, that helps to run up a bill fast. It would be difficult to account for these bills, except in such ways.

It appears from Mr. Summers' Report, before referred to, that the whole contingent expenses of the House of Representatives rose from \$106,000, in the 18th Congress, till they attained a maximum in the 25th Congress, of \$595,000, increasing nearly 6 to 1 in sixteen years.

It also appears, that the contingent expenses of the Senate for the year 1828, under Mr. Van Buren, were *greater*, by the sum of \$86,000, than for 1828, under Mr. J. Q. Adams; and *greater*, by \$24,000, than for the whole *four years*, under Mr. Adams. A like result turns up in comparing the contingent expenses of the House for the same periods; viz. that the *aggregate*, during Mr. Adams's *four years*, was *less*, by \$89,000, than the same item for the *one year*, 1838, under Mr. Van Buren. (Compare No. 17, House Doc. 1st Sess. 26th Congress, with No. 39, House Doc. 1st Sess. 24th Congress.)

#### FINANCIAL PRODIGALITIES OF THE FLORIDA WAR.

The profuse and wasteful expenditures of public money, as partially disclosed under this head, and one or two others, might *alone* account for the startling expenses of Government during the two administrations preceding the one now current, as compared with our former financial history and the level of public expenditures as reduced by the 27th Congress. We have room only for a few quotations from the volumes of public documents on this and other kindred topics, which may serve as a clue to the rest.

#### *Extravagant hire of steamboats and other vessels.*

From the beginning of 1836 to 1841, the number of steamboats and sail craft employed in the transportation service for the Florida war, was 737, for which a very extravagant hire was generally paid. About *fifty* of these are named in House Document No. 458, 2d Session 27th Congress, and their rates of hire specified. We give the following as specimens:—The steamboat, John Crowell, estimated to be worth \$15,000, was hired at \$300 a day, provided for and insured, till the compensation amounted to \$82,555. The Reindeer, 42 days, at \$175 a day—being \$7,350. The Georgiana, 32 days, at \$200 a day—\$6,400. The Charleston, 10 months, at \$4,400 a month—\$44,000. The Mobile was paid \$11,625 for 25 days. The Minerva, 73 days, at \$300 a day—\$21,900. The Merchant, 85 days, at \$450 a day—\$38,250.

Many other vessels were hired for short periods, at rates, which, on settlement,

*quadrupled* the price at which they might have been purchased in the outset, so that much money would have been saved, if they had been bought and manned, and then burnt in the end.

#### *The cost of a wagon.*

Grant's concentric wheel wagon cost the Government \$2,363.50, of which Mr. Grant was paid \$654.50 for superintending the construction of it, and \$15 was paid for engraving plates on the wheels, to travel in the sands of Florida. *Ibid.*

#### *Cost of 206 oxen.*

The purchase and delivery of 206 oxen was made to cost \$12,187.20—for the oxen, \$9,170.00; to the agent, \$1,950.00; and for expenses in the transaction, \$1,037.20. *Ibid.*

#### *Cost of house-rent and saddles.*

A house at Picolata was rented at \$3,600 a year. For 30 saddles, \$50 each was paid. For 12 do. \$87.50 each. *Ibid.*

At Pilotka, in 1840, when the end of the war was every day expected, more than \$100,000 was expended in public buildings, *on private lands*, when there was government land hard by. It is of course sacrificed.

#### *Probable collusion in fraud on the public.*

The foregoing items of extravagance are hastily selected from heaps of evidence of the same class brought before the 27th Congress, by which it is proved, that the Florida war was generally carried on, in whole and in particular, at a rate of most astounding prodigality. All the public agents in these transactions, from the Treasury Department at Washington, down to the last recipient of the public money, were perfectly familiar with this daily round of facts, for a course of years. Can it be imagined, that in any state of society, however corrupt, such extravagance and waste would be tolerated, under the eyes of so many agents, if there was no *collusion* among them, and if they did not *all* profit more or less by it! Do not these facts reasonably account for the protracted period of that war, when so much money was to be made out of it by all engaged?

#### *Great frauds in the removal of Indians.*

The removal of 16,533 Creek Indians was made to cost the Government \$590,448.58. It is proved pretty fairly, by the Committee on Public Expenditures, that these 16,533 Indians *might* have been removed for \$186,530, thus making a clear saving, in this single transaction, *honestly done*, of \$303,909.42—nearly two thirds of the actual cost. (Doc. No. 458.)

It is proved in House Document No. 451, 2d Sess. 27th Congress, that Captain Buckner was paid \$37,749 for *doing nothing*, after having been paid a very exorbitant price for what he *did do*, in removing Indians;—and the most remarkable part of the disclosure is, that a high public functionary received \$18,000 of this as a loan from Capt. Buckner, *apparently* for his company and presence at the Treasury Department when the reposition was being made out. Whether such company *silenced* the scruples of the Auditor, this deponent cannot say. The evidence before the Committee standeth thus: Witness (Capt. Buckner) asked—"What he could do for him?" Ans. "Witness could loan him some money. Whereupon witness agreed to loan him \$18,000."

All these accounts were allowed at the Treasury Department!

It is also proved that Captain Collins was entrusted with large sums of money, as disbursing agent, to the aggregate of \$582,290, *after* he had proved himself a defaulter to one-third of this amount, and that the Government lost by him in the end the sum of \$215,369. If settlements had been insisted on according to law, it would have been impossible, in any case of the most willful fraud, to lose more than a small fraction of this amount.—(See No. 453, House Doc., 2d Sess., 27th Congress.)

#### *Remarks on these facts.*

Speaking *moderately*, it may be presumed, from the volumes of evidence of this description that have been filed by the 27th Congress, that by an honest and prudent administration of these affairs, the Florida war might have been brought to a close, and the Indian tribes all removed, *at one half the actual cost to the country*. Moreover, from what has transpired, there is also a reasonable presumption that the *period* of the Florida war might have been abridged by several years.

Can any one suppose there was *no collusion, no connivance* among those who had the responsibility in these great concerns, for the advantage, pecuniary or political, that might accrue to them personally? With some the profit was pecuniary, with others political.

### *Defalcation and frauds under the Subtreasury system.*

We mean the system of entrusting the public funds in the hands of individuals, instead of keeping them in banks. It is not easy to collect an exact account of this, but from the reports of Mr. Secretary Woodbury—a reluctant witness—of 1834, 1838, and 1839, on this subject, we obtain the following result from his somewhat mystified statements, in connexion with other facts that have transpired, viz:—that the Government, since its foundation, had lost by banks, \$857,890.85; and by individuals, in the various forms of trust, about \$15,000,000.

It is now ascertained, that the loss by individuals in Mr. Van Buren's four years, as the result of his system of Subtreasury, was about \$5,000,000, if we include what has since been developed under the operation of that system, and through his appointees; whereas, the first *Whig* defalcator in public trust, for two years, is yet to be found out. The annual aggregate of frauds, therefore, of Mr. Van Buren's Subtreasury system, may be put down at \$1,250,000. The annual aggregate of like frauds by the Whigs, so far as has transpired—0.

It is somewhat remarkable, that the account between the Government and the United States Bank, as to loss and profit in all transactions for forty years, stands thus:—Loss to Government—0; profit to Government—\$1,100,000, for premium on stocks, besides dividends, and the gratuitous functions of the bank as fiscal agent of the Government for the said forty years.

### *A recollection.*

All must remember the disclosures forced from Mr. Secretary Woodbury, under the late administration, regarding the frequency, character, and great amount of defalcations under the Subtreasury, and the concurrent proofs brought before the public of Executive indulgence towards the offenders, in continuing them in office after their defalcations were proved—all for *partisan, political objects*.

### *Frauds in the New York Custom House.*

The enormities that have been practised in this "Seat of Customs," are prodigious. The defalcations of Swartwout, Hoyt, & Co.—amounting to about *one million and a half*, seem to have veiled the *minor* frauds. In three years, 1838, '39, and '40, George A. Wasson received \$94,430.92 for cartage and labor—nearly half for cartage—effected chiefly by charging for each package, 31½ to 50 cents, which was the price for a *load*—in that way making a load run up to *five or ten* dollars, according to the number of packages. The Stationery and printing, under Mr. Hoyt, for 1838, '39, '40, and 1st quarter of 1841, cost \$51,703.22—averaging \$275.76 a year to each person employed, being nearly *double* the average cost of stationery for each member of the House of Representatives in the 25th Congress, that being \$287 for 2 years. It was by allowing \$22 a gross for steel pens, when they could be bought for \$1.50; \$3.50 a peck for sand, the fair price being 12½ cents; \$80 a ream for paper, worth \$15; \$12 for 1 card of Perryan pens, or \$1.50 for each pen; &c. &c. &c. No difficulty in making it up in that way.

The revenue collected in the first year of Jonathan Thompson, 1825, was \$15,754,827; employed 142 men, at a cost of \$211,471; or at the rate of 1 34-100 per cent. The revenue collected by Mr. Hoyt, in 1840, was \$7,591,760; men employed 470, at a cost of \$563,829; or at the rate of 7 42-100 per cent.

In addition to the Collector's Salary, Mr. Hoyt, in violation of law, as alleged by the Committee on Public Expenditures, took to himself, in all, \$29,883.36 for *storage* of Merchandise in buildings rented on *his private account*, while the Government is charged \$29,294.24 for salaries of storekeeper, clerks, and inspectors, and for stationery, employed and used in said buildings.

Mr. Hoyt was reported to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury, as a defaulter for \$226,295.31. But Mr. Hoyt, anticipating this, charged the Government (with his own hand, his clerk refusing) \$201,580, that is, 1 per cent. on \$20,158,000 paid over by him to the orders of the Secretary of the Treasury—that is, 1 per cent. for the banking part of the Collector's functions.

In two years and four months, Mr. Butler, District Attorney, was paid by Mr. Hoyt, Collector, for services, \$62,690.50. Mr. Hoyt's gleanings, it would seem, were somewhat less than a *quarter of a million* for about three years service. (House Docs. Nos. 202 & 669, 2d Sess. 27th Cong.)

We are sorry to observe, that the present Executive has in nowise *abated* the extravagancies of the New York Custom House.

### *Public buildings.*

In 1836 Congress authorized the erection of a new Patent Office, the expense of which should not exceed \$708,000. It is now expected it will cost, when finished, between \$600,000 and \$700,000. The Custom House at Boston was begun under a provision not to cost over \$50,000.



It has already cost \$696,000, and will require \$156,000 more to finish it. The New York Custom House was begun with an appropriation of \$200,000, and has cost over \$1,100,000. [For more of the kind, see No. 460, House Doc. 2d Sess. 27th Congress.]

#### *The Branch Mints.*

These were designed, especially the one at New Orleans, to make Gold flow up the Mississippi. It seems they have rather tended to make it flow out into the Sea. That at New Orleans cost \$554,470. The three branches cost \$822,457. They were established in 1838, and previous to 1842 had coined \$2,884,708. The Philadelphia Mint cost \$209,230, and in 1836 alone coined \$7,764,900. The cost of coining at the branch mints has been 28 cents and 3 mills for each dollar. The cost of coining at Philadelphia 13 cents and 9 mills for one hundred dollars.

Items expended on the New Orleans Mint:—\$8,099 for 4 bath-houses, flagging yard, and paving side-walk; \$3,846 for paving yard; \$1,700 for 7 baths and 1 water closet; \$818 for finishing water closets; &c. &c. The voucher list of expenditures, numbering 272, is a curiosity—especially edifying to those who pay for it. [House Doc. No. 462, 2d Sess. 27th Congress.]

#### *Frauds in contracts for mail bags, blanks, &c.*

From House Doc. No. 989, 2d Session, 27th Congress, it appears, that the cost of mail bags, from 1831 to 1841, was \$336,000; that Mr. Jewett, Ohio, contractor, was paid \$68,124.13 for 4,782 bags; that, in November, 1840, there were on his (Jewett's) hands 4,020 bags, not wanted, which cost \$65,000; that a large overplus was in the hands of other contractors; that bags could be got at 50 per cent. less than was paid in those years; that, for blanks, \$300,000 was paid between 1829 and 1841, generally at about 50 per cent. more than fair price, leaving a supply on hand for twenty years to come; that storage for these surplus articles was charged and allowed; that, by these and other frauds, the expenditures of the Post Office Department were made to exceed its revenue, one year, by \$386,759.19, and another year by \$220,000, thus requiring special appropriations out of the revenue from Customs and public lands, and rolling a heavy burden on the 27th (Whig) Congress; that Cyrus Barton, Concord, N. H., for blanks, from 1836 to 1841, received \$13,927.14; Beals & Green, Boston, Mass., from 1829 to 1832, for do., received \$51,732.76; Paine & Clark, New York, from 1836 to 1841, for do. do. \$18,883.81; S. Penn, Jr. Louisville, Ky., for do. do. from 1830 to 1841, \$26,942.58; S. Medary, Columbus, Ohio, in 1835, for do. do. \$17,546.34; &c. &c. &c.

All these, and other like favors, "for being always at their post, actively engaged"—"stopping at no sacrifice that would insure success"—"in promoting the interests of the noble cause"—"which heartily entitled them to Executive favor"—&c., as stated in letters to the President. See Doc. 989, as above.

The same Committee (on Public Expenditures) speak of the establishment of many new mail routes and post offices, not required, at great expense, for the benefit of partisan favorites, and of the "deep, dark, and unfathomable sinks," out of which these facts were fished, where many more of the same kind yet abide, which could not be hooked up.

#### *Sundries of a like kind.*

From Document No. 756 of the House 2d Session, 27th Congress, it appears, that the Commissioning of Ships, and the increase of officers in the Navy, have been at the discretion of the Executive; that the expenses of the Navy had been doubled in 10 years; that naval officers had been multiplied beyond former example, without sufficient cause; that the number in 1835 was 1,051 and in 1842 was 1512, when 365, with an aggregate pay of \$350,000, were "absent on leave, or waiting orders," that is, doing nothing; that many had been thus unemployed for ten, twelve, or fourteen years, receiving pay, and being promoted; that the annual cost of the "coast survey" had risen from \$20,000 in 1832 to \$100,000 in 1840; that the Superintendent of the "Coast Survey" had a salary of \$6,000, one of his Assistants \$4,000, three others \$3,000 each, and three more \$2,000 each; that from 1834 to 1841, seventy-two naval officers, at different times, had been detailed into the "Coast Survey" service, and while thus occupied, received double pay; that the Revenue Cutter service, being at the discretion of the Executive, rose from an annual cost of \$163,755 in 1830, to \$274,803 in 1837, while the revenue collected had decreased about one third; that the expenses of the Land Office rose in one year from \$23,500 to \$108,750, and remained in 1841 at \$98,500, when the land revenue was only \$1,400,000; and that the expenses of the army had risen from \$2,100,935 in 1829, to \$4,197,028 in 1841.

#### *Extra Allowances.*

The above instance of 72 naval officers detailed into the "Coast Survey" service, with extra pay, is an example. This license, unwarranted by law, had pervaded the army and navy, and crept into other branches of the public service, to such an extent, as to amount, in the aggregate, to scarcely, if at all less than a million a year. It was a germ of corruption, of alarming growth, corresponding with the plurality system under the British Government, which the reformers of that nation are fast breaking down, and which has always been allowed to be one of the greatest enormities in the British empire.

#### *Expenditures without authority of law.*

Liberties of this kind, to a great extent, were taken, in the progress of the two administrations that preceded the present. A very licentious practice of voting large contingent funds, for the different departments of Government, had obtained, which presented temptations, and opened a floodgate of corruption, to the higher and lower public functionaries. Many hundred thousand dollars had in this way been put at the discretion of the existing Administration, no small portion



of which was squandered for most unsuitable partisan or private ends. The sacred deposits of trust funds of various descriptions, were invaded and exhausted, without sanction of law.

The new practice of having large outstanding appropriations, lying over from one year to another, which often amounted to many millions, enough in some cases for the annual expenditures of the Government, was introduced and carried on in the last two administrations, and has often been abused by applying such appropriations to objects not designated by law, at the discretion of the Administration. In this way, there was never any want of funds, when a partisan object required it, or a private whim was to be gratified, or favorites wanted patronage.

Secret and partisan emissaries were by this means sent out, under the guise of Government Agents, for this, that, or the other object, the chief errand being confidential. It was only necessary to have a *nominal* Government design, though unauthorized by law, to find an apology for drawing on contingent or trust funds, or on dormant outstanding appropriations. *Special* Agents, almost without number, were, from time to time, put in commission for home or foreign missions, on the basis of this practice.

Mr. George Plitt was sent abroad, as Post Office Agent, under Amos Kendall, at \$16 a day, till the expenses ran up to 9,666.64, the payment of which was sanctioned by Mr. Van Buren, as President, *without authority of law*. In the same manner three young men were sent out in 1839, by Mr. Poinsett, Secretary of War, to the Cavalry School, at Saumur, in France, and three more in 1840—all *without authority of law*. Americans sent to Europe to learn to ride and manage a horse, at the public expense, at the whim of a public functionary, and *without legislative sanction!*

An Administration partisan press also experienced the benefits of contingent and disposable funds in the hands of the Executive and his agents. In the two years of 1838 and 1839, Mr. Kendall, Post Master General, contrived to run up bills for advertising and printing in one Newspaper office, the Statesman, Columbus, Ohio, to the amount of \$9,848.21. (Blue Book.) And so it was done all over the Union, by the different Executive Departments at Washington.

#### Remark.

It should be observed, that the quotations we have made, showing extravagance and corruption in the Government, are only a *few* selections, extracted from voluminous and authentic public documents, furnished principally by that laborious and indefatigable Committee on Public Expenditures, whose toils in the last Congress have brought so much of hitherto concealed frauds to the light of day. The number and extent of them are hardly credible, and we regret that we have not space for more copious extracts. What we give is merely as a *peep* into the great mass, the entire of which will readily account for the extraordinary and otherwise unaccountable expenditures of the last two Administrations, *from whose books our facts and figures come.*

#### Comparative expenses of our Government at different periods.

The expenses of our Government down to the end of Mr. Jefferson's administration, appear to have been frugal and exemplary. The cost of Washington's administration, comprehending *eight* years, was *only*

Washington's administration, eight years, was only	\$15,892,188
Of John Adams's four years,	21,450,351
Of Jefferson's eight do.,	41,300,783

As the war with Great Britain came under Mr. Madison's terms of office, *eight* years, the expenses were of course *extraordinary*, and mounted up to \$144,684,939

Monroe's eight years,	104,463,400
J. Q. Adams's four do.	50,501,914

It may be thought that the expenses of Mr. Monroe's and Mr J. Q. Adams's administrations, were disproportionately large, as compared with the earlier days of the republic. But the growth of the country may account for a part of it, and the grander projects of the nation, suggested by the experience of the war, for the other part.

But it is somewhat *startling* to find the expenses of General Jackson's administration of *eight* years mounting up to \$145,792,735, being greater than the cost of Mr. Madison's eight years, which had the war with Great Britain on hand. But yet *more* startling is the announcement of the fact, that Mr. Van Buren's administration of only *four* years, cost the nation \$140,585,321. In *eight* years, at this rate, it would have been 281,170,642.

There are no *apparent* reasons, aside from the facts disclosed by the investigating Committees of the 27th Congress—nor are these *very satisfactory*—for this rapid and amazing increase of national expenditures. Besides, that the Florida war was unnecessarily protracted and unnecessarily expensive, as has been shown, by the corruption and frauds involved in it, *that*, even as it was, will not account for but a small fraction of this great excess of expenditures above all former example. And what else extraordinary was there?

#### Appropriations of the 27th Congress—great reduction of expenditures.

Appropriations are generally in excess of the expenditures, with a view of grant-



But the first thing he does, is to spend all the money left in his hands; then he calls in the debts, which were intended to remain on interest, and spends that; by want of foresight, bad management, and prodigality, the income from the farms and other property gradually falls off, and there is not enough to keep the estate in order; by the same cause this state of things waxes worse and worse, and the estate is running in debt; all his employees he indulges in the same habits of extravagance and profligacy, whose influence, coming in aid of his, helps on the general ruin; he is compelled largely to anticipate his income, and draw on the future; till at last, when the time of his stewardship has expired, the estate is deeply involved, is greatly injured by bad husbandry, the morals of the tenants are very much altered for the worse; and take it all in all, the next steward that comes, finds a hard enough task of it, to save the estate from complete ruin.

The story we have told is that of the last Administration of our national affairs.

#### *Retrenchment and Reform.*

THE GRAND RESULT of reducing the appropriations to a little over sixteen millions a year, is sufficient evidence of what the 27th Congress achieved, in the way of *retrenchment and reform*. They found every department of the Government more or less ill organized, inefficient, extravagant, and corrupt, exerting a most pernicious influence on the morals of the people, and squandering the public funds by tens of thousands, and by millions. The expenditures of the Government, by such means, had been *tripled* since the administration of Mr. J. Q. Adams; but the 27th Congress, by applying the axe of retrenchment, with a salutary vengeance, brought the expenditures back again—*fully back*, if we take into consideration the growth of the country. Boldly did they take the axe in hand, right lustily did they wield it, with coats and hats off, and the result is announced to the world. They spared not the estimates sent in by the Executive Departments, but cut them down by millions.

The cases to which the knife of excision, or the grubbing tools of eradication, have been applied, are too numerous for specification in our limits. We can only speak of them generally.

Some *millions* were lopped off from the expenses of the army, by an Act which reorganized and reduced it largely, and abolished numerous sinecures, and the corrupt custom of *extra* allowances, which sometimes exceeded regular pay, and which, as a whole, were enormous. The abuses that had crept into the army, augmenting expenditures, were flagrant and startling. They were boldly taken in hand, and provided against for the future.

There was the Board of Navy Commissioners in their easy chairs at Washington, deteriorating the Navy every day, and wasting money in vast sums by their decisions. It was abolished; and the whole Navy Department was reorganized by an Act of Congress, introducing a new system of economy and efficiency, as well in the machinery of the Department itself, as in the various branches of the naval service—thereby retrenching from *one to two millions* in the general service, and saving *many millions* from waste.

An Act was passed amending the organization of the Civil Departments, suppressing the system of contingent and general appropriations; cutting off the power of pensioning a partisan press, by ordering the public printing to be done on contract with fair dealers, in open market; ordering purchases and other Government Jobbings, on the same principle; reducing and limiting allowances of various kinds—all a *saving of millions*.

The vast peculations and frauds in the Indian Department, Land Offices, and Custom Houses, were hunted out and reformed—an *immense saving*. The contingent expenses of Congress were cut down to an honest level, and former abuses corrected. All branches of the public service were thoroughly overhauled, examined, retrenched, and reformed—to the *saving of many millions*, as the appropriations demonstrate.

#### *An instructive fact.*

If the estimates of the Executive Departments, as sent into Congress, had been taken as the rule of legislation in the appropriations, we should have been but little, if at all, better off than before. The 27th Congress thought it their duty to cut them down *by many millions*. All this will serve to convince the people how little sympathy there is in the Executive for their burdens, and that they must look to Congress, if they have a good one, for retrenchment and reform. The Executive has no interest in such operations, but the contrary. From that quarter come all abuses in the way of extravagance and corruption. At that very moment, and all the while that the 27th Congress were doing this great work for the *people*, the Executive and his pensioned press were waging a fierce and savage war against them, and denouncing them as the *enemies* of the people.

#### *Private Justice.*

It is the highest praise of a Government, that it respects *private Justice*. A large national debt had been hanging over us for many years, in the form of *private claims*, which Congress after Congress had warded off, and refused to hear, lest they should have money to pay. That *appears* to have been the reason that had filled the hearts of widows, orphans, and decrepit old men, with despair for a nation's injustice. It is certain, that former Congresses found enough other ways for their money.

But the 27th Congress marched straight into these long arrears, examined the files, heard about a *thousand* cases, and granted relief in a little less than *three hundred*, which added so much to the demands on the Treasury. But it was *Just*. The appropriations for *private claims* at the last session were a little less than *one thirtieth* of the whole amount for a single year. We have not the means of exact comparison, but we think the private claims *acted* upon by the last Congress, were *six*, if not *ten* to one of the average of the preceding six Congresses—all which were left a debt by the preceding Administrations on the present.



*The time occupied in the Sessions of the 27th Congress.*

It was 450 days, about sixteen months—the longest time any other American Congress ever sat, by about three months. This has been made a subject of accusation without considering, 1. That they had the *Apportionment* on a new census to fix, a work the materials of which are ten years accumulating, for which it would be no more than fair to allow *one month*. 2. That they had the *Tariff* to readjust, another accumulation of ten years, which may fairly be put down for *three months*, on account of the greatness and difficulties of the task, in the peculiar circumstances of the case. There were between *six and seven hundred* articles to legislate upon, each of which was enough for a separate bill. *Six* plans of *Tariff* were got up, *four* passed, and *two* were *vetoed*. 3. *The currency question*, which, including all the hindrances and embarrassments occasioned by the *Veto*es, and the new projects in the form of *Exchequer* plans, probably did not consume less than *three months*. 4. For the labors in retrenchment and reform, it is proper to allow *another month*.

All these will probably be allowed to be *extraordinary*, not usually claiming the attention of Congress; and they amount altogether to *eight months*—which is half the time occupied by the three Sessions.

When, therefore, these facts are considered, in connexion with the grand total of their labors, that the aggregate of the Reports made in both Houses, was 1849; of joint resolutions and bills acted on, 1328; and of laws finally passed, 514; the laws averaging as much *more than one a day*, as 514 exceeds 450, a far greater proportion than any other Congress ever did in a given time; when all this is considered, the accusation falls to the ground, and the 27th Congress stands forth, not only vindicated, but entitled to the highest praise, in this particular. Certainly, it can never be said, that, by their protracted Sessions, they have *increased* the expenses of Government, when it is proved, that they have *reduced* them *one half*.

*The discipline of the 27th Congress:*

Notwithstanding all the clamor about gag-laws, suppression of the freedom of debate, &c., it is now generally conceded, even by the opposition in the late Congress, certainly it is felt by the country, that the one hour rule, and the assumption in the House of Representatives of the right to limit debate in Committee of the Whole, are among the best and most important regulations ever adopted by a deliberative body. It is a great reform, and it was by this, and by this only, that the 27th Congress were enabled to accomplish such a vast amount of business so *creately* in excess of all preceding Congresses, in a given time.

The custom that had grown up, of allowing one speech to be spun out two, sometimes three whole days, was an outrage, that should be scouted from the nation, with the indignant voice of popular reprobation.

*Land Distribution.*

Although, like the action of Congress on the currency question, this also was a failure by the interposition of the veto power, it was nevertheless a prominent and important feature in the history of the 27th Congress.

The terms of the cession were, that these "lands shall be a *common fund* for the use and benefit of such of the United States as *have* become, or *shall* become members of the Confederacy, *according to their usual respective* proportions in the general charge and expenditure," *after* the objects of cession shall have been answered. General Jackson, in his message of 1832, says, "as the lands may now be considered as *released from the pledge*, the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished, it is in the discretion of Congress to dispose of them," &c.

Besides the equity and consequent obligations of the case, there are *four* cogent political and eminently practical reasons, which urge distribution in *some* form. 1. The States are but integral parts of a whole—the Union. If the parts are weak, the whole is weak; and if the parts are strong, the whole is strong. The interests of the parts cannot be disjoined from those of the whole. 2. In the Federal Constitution, the States have relinquished the right of collecting revenue from imposts, and it is vested in the United States. This will naturally be regarded as conferring some obligations on the United States to be at least *considerate* and *kind* towards the States in their needs, when in danger of being driven to direct taxation for want of this power, and to help them if they can without violating the Constitution. 3. It will always be felt, and we think with truth and justice, and felt more and more, that it was the action of the Federal Government, which brought the indebted States and other parties, and the country generally, into these difficulties. Hence arises the obligation to render assistance, when it can be done in a proper and Constitutional way. 4. The importance of rescuing the tariff system from the fluctuating influence of an ever shifting land revenue, and the practical evils resulting from this connexion, would seem sufficient to make it better to *give* away the public lands, than to have such a disturbing cause for ever acting on the *Tariff* policy. Once dispose of this agitating question, and let the General Government depend on a *Tariff* for support, we may then hope for a permanent and uniform system of revenue and finance.

*Funding the public debt.*

This was a part of the doings of the 27th Congress. It will have been seen in a former part of this Tract, in what an embarrassed condition Mr. Van Buren left the Treasury and the public finances; that he *came in* with *six millions* in the Treasury, afterwards took the *eight millions* of United States bank stock, and the *nine millions* instalment due the States—in all, with their fractions and interest, about *twenty-four millions* over and above the *revenue*—and that he *went out*, leaving the Treasury involved with *six millions* and a *half* of *debt*, in the form of Treasury notes, and other liabilities in the form of outstanding appropriations, amounting in all to nearly *thirty-five millions*. Add this *thirty-five millions* to the *twenty-four millions*, above referred to,



and deduct nine millions of outstanding appropriations left for Mr. Van Buren to provide for when he came into power, and we have the result of *fifty millions run up* by Mr. Van Buren in his four years, *over and above* the public revenue.

Beside all this, there was a constantly *descending* revenue, resulting from the conditions of the compromise act of 1832, and from the misfortunes of the country. *Five millions* were to fall off by the first of these causes, in 1841, and *five millions* more in 1842.

With this astounding state of things, inherited by the new administration, with *such* a debt, *such* liabilities of the Treasury, and *such* a revenue—what was to be done?

The Whigs of the 27th Congress, like all honest men, were compelled to *recognise* the debt; to call it by its right name; but what should they do with it, and how provide for the prospect before them? They took the bull by the horns at once, put a ring in his nose, and got him under control, instead of hanging on to his tail, and being dragged after him in his wild and furious career, as the previous administration had done. They *funded the debt*, or a small part of it, *twelve millions*, and undertook to manage the rest as well as they could, by Treasury notes and other expedients, till prosperity might return under the operation of the contemplated Tariff.

#### *Providing for the extinction of the public debt.*

When a man has got in debt, if not discouraged, he undertakes to get out by fresh enterprise and frugality. There was no other way for the 27th Congress to provide for the extinction of the public debt imposed upon them by the previous administration, but by restoring public prosperity by a Tariff. This they put in order, and by it the nation may gradually be relieved of all its burdens.

#### *Who created this public debt?*

In view of the facts we have presented, it might seem very superfluous to put this question; and yet the Locofoeo press throughout the country is constantly iterating and reiterating the charge, that the Whigs made it.

We observe a *confession* from the Hon. Cave Johnson, of Tennessee, in circulation, of a debt of \$7,480,692.18, on the 4th of March, 1841, when Mr. Van Buren retired—which he (Mr. Johnson) professes to have got from the Treasury. Add to this the outstanding appropriations, not reckoned by him, of \$28,906,090.76, (House Doc. 281, 2d. Sess. 27th Con.), saddled on the incoming administration, and it makes the debt thus descending, or inherited, \$36,386,782.94. These being the liabilities of the Treasury on that occasion, constitute the true story of the debt.

The amount of these outstanding or undrawn appropriations, is remarkable. One fourth of this would be an egregious fault at any time. But the out-going administration on the 4th of March, 1841, had used up all funds, run down the revenue, got in debt, and found it *convenient* to saddle the burden on their successors, who had to provide for it all.

#### *Mr. Van Buren's furtive mode of creating a public debt.*

There is another cause of national debt which may be called *furtive*, growing out of the last administration, and *stealing* upon the present. It was neglecting to provide a revenue for the future, or permitting our only system of revenue to *run down or run out*. They *broke* it down. A Government is as much bound to provide for four years to come, as for next year; or is as responsible for breaking down the revenue for four coming years, as for one. By such means it *entails* a national debt. It is precisely the same as if it had left one.

It has been seen, that Mr. Van Buren used up *thirty millions* more than the revenue of his term of office; that he left more than *thirty millions* of a positive burden on the succeeding administration; and in addition to all this, he so managed our financial system, that it would not be possible to get more than *half* as much revenue in the next four years as he got in his term, without a new organization, the benefits of which could not be realized under two or three years—scarcely less than four. All these things considered, the burden entailed by Mr. Van Buren on the succeeding administration, could not be less than *fifty millions*—a sum nearly enough to support a prudent administration for a whole term of four years.

#### *The worst thing of all.*

It were a small matter, that the expenses of Government should have been raised *one half* or *one third* higher than was necessary, by fraud, speculation, defalcation, and extravagance, pervading all its departments, as has been proved in these pages, if the destruction of the currency and other ruinous disasters, brought upon the whole nation and all its parts, by a mistaken and fatal policy, had not rendered the burden so heavy—so intolerable; and if, moreover, the Government had not allowed the system of revenue itself to be broken down, thus leading to direct taxation of a people, who, by such causes, had been made so poor as to have nothing to pay it with. If they had left us the old state of things, our prosperity and our means, they might have run up the expenses of Government to *fifty*, or even a *hundred millions* a year—and we could have borne and carried it all easily.

#### *Confession of Mr. Woodbury.*

In December, 1840, Mr. Woodbury, then Secretary of the Treasury, said in his annual Report:—

“Thus the progressive reduction of the present Tariff, which has been going on since 1833, will, after December, 1841, take effect to a much larger extent than heretofore. Nearly two millions and a half will then be deducted at once.

¶ (For page 6.) Omitted—rather curious:—In 1837 Congress made an appropriation of \$210,000 to remove obstructions in the mouth of the Mississippi. Various attempts were made at a cost of \$223,231, in the bill of which we find the following interesting and *appropriate* items:—For silver watches, \$366; for hardware, \$3,322; for port wine, \$29.25; fines to sheriff, \$14.10; horses, \$23; hire of carriages, \$52.25; omnibus tickets, \$1.75; painting office sign, \$9; dry goods, \$106; mosquito bars, \$120; tinslin, \$77.53; repairing watches, \$45.50; &c. &c. &c. (House Doc. 458, 2d Sess. 27th Congress.)

"On the 1st of July afterwards, at least two millions and a half more of duties will be removed; making an aggregate in six months, of quite five millions. If the imports then should not differ much from those in 1838, this would leave an income from them not probably exceeding ten or eleven millions of dollars yearly. It will therefore be necessary to make corresponding reductions in the expenditures of 1842, or *seasonably provide otherwise, in some permanent manner, to supply all wants likely to happen from this cause.*"

This is a confession to be noted, as coming from Mr. Woodbury, whose faculty of concealing such truths was pre-eminent. As a peep into the future from that position, however, and as usual for him, it does not disclose a thousandth part of the difficulties to be encountered, arising out of the improvidence and wastefulness of the Administration of which he was a part. There is, nevertheless, in this confession, a foreshadowing of a coming crisis. That *Crisis*, induced by the previous administration, the Whigs of the 27th Congress had to meet, and provide for. Mr. Van Buren and his friends, adhering to their principles, would have been overthrown by it. They could never have repaired the mischief they had done.

#### The Districting Law.

The Constitution, on this subject, reads thus:—"The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators."

Now, it happens, that the law of the 27th Congress, requiring each State to be divided into as many Congressional districts as there are Representatives, to the end that each member may represent his own district, still leaves the detail of these regulations, as to "*times, places, and manner of holding the elections, to be prescribed by the State legislatures,*" as above directed by the Constitution, so that nothing of the power thus vested in the States, is taken away, notwithstanding the right of Congress to "*alter such regulations by law at any time,*" is clearly given in the same sentence. There is therefore not the *slightest* invasion of the pretended claim of the States, by this law. They are only required to elect by *Districts*, instead of the *general ticket*.

The benefits of the district system are, 1. *Uniformity* in the mode of elections. Before, some, and most of the States, acted on the district system; others elected by general ticket. 2. *Fairness* to all political parties. It might happen, when the majority of the people of the United States were of one political party, that the adoption of the general ticket in two or three States, should give the opposite party the ascendancy in Congress—a very improper advantage. 3. The District system is *more democratic*, and gives a chance to every district to elect a man whom the people *know*, to represent *them* and their interests; whereas the other system is controlled by the nominations of a few political demagogues, who thus control the people of a whole State, and the people of the Union. It is *anti-democratic*.

If Representatives elected by general ticket should be admitted into the next Congress, it will be *against a law of the land*—it will be nullification in the boldest form, the nullifiers standing up and acting in the capacity of the Supreme legislators.

#### The remedial Justice bill.

In the passage of this bill, the 27th Congress had to grapple with and settle one of the most delicate and most momentous questions involved in the relations of Federal and State Jurisdictions. All know, that the Constitution forbids the States to make war, or peace, or treaties with foreign powers; from which it might justly be inferred, that no State has a right so to exercise its independent authorities as to *breed* war. Yet it is manifest, that such was the tendency and hazard of the action of the New York authorities in the case of Alexander M'Leod.

The object attained by the *Remedial Justice bill*, is to bring all such questions, involving international relations, under the *Federal Jurisdiction*, and into the Courts of the United States, where they properly belong, so that it shall not be in the power of the authorities of a single State to involve the United States in war.

#### The Tariff.

This is a difficult subject, both in theory and practice. Facts only can decide the questions that rise.

#### Tariff axioms.

1. *Free trade means fair trade*, in popular phrase. 2. *Fair trade* requires, that if one nation has a tariff, its neighbor, trading with it, must have an equal one, for self-protection. 3. And consequently, the *principles* of free trade, require *equal* tariffs, or none at all. 4. Since other nations, with which we trade, have tariffs, we must have one too, to maintain our own rights, or unwisely suffer disadvantage and loss. 5. *Reciprocity* in tariffs is a principle of free trade—that is, the same *practically*.

#### Specimens of foreign tariffs.

The British Tariff on Louisiana sugar is 270 per cent.; on molasses, 400 do.; on American tobacco, 1200 do.; on our spirits from grain, 2700 do.; on our wheat, 60 do.; on our salt beef, 80 do.; on our pork, 68 do.; on our bacon, 85 do.; on our timber, 96 do.; on our staves, 110 do.; &c. &c. &c. British duties on our most important agricultural staples—cotton excepted—are intended to be prohibitory, and are so. The duties collected in Europe on American tobacco, are *thirty-five millions of dollars annually*—equal to the average annual expenditure of Mr. Van Buren's Administration; and *double* of the annual appropriations of the 27th (Whig) Congress. Surely, it is no more than fair to get something back for all this which foreigners get out of us—at least *half* of what Europe gets on our tobacco, which would amply support our Government under a *Whig* Administration.

*Objections to the Tariff of 1842.*

It is said it is *too high*. The following is a comparative statement (direct from the Treasury Department) of the Tariffs of 1824, '28, '32-3, and '42, in regard to a list of some of the most important articles, by which it will be seen that there is no foundation for this objection:—

Species of Merchandise.	Rates of duty under the Tariffs of			
	1824.	1828.	1832-3.	1842.
Cloths and cassimeres . . . . .	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ per ct.	55 per ct.	50 per ct.	40 per ct.
Merino shawls of wool . . . . .	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	55 "	50 "	40 "
Blankets not above 75 cents each . . . . .	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	38 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	5 "	15 "
" above 75 cents each . . . . .	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	38 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	25 "	25 "
Woolen hosiery, gloves, mits, &c. . . . .	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	38 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	25 "	30 "
Worsted stuffs . . . . .	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	free	30 "
Worsted yarn . . . . .	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	20 per ct.	30 "
Woolen yarn . . . . .	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	50 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 4 cts.	30 "
Other manufactures of wool . . . . .	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	50 per ct.	40 "
Wool unmanufactured not above 8 cts. per pound . . . . .	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	55 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 4 cts.	free	5 "
" above 8 cents per pound . . . . .	33 "	55 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 4 cts.	40 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 4 cts.	30 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 3 cts.
Flannels . . . . .	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	49 $\frac{1}{2}$ per ct.	16 cts.	14 cts.
Baizes . . . . .	36 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	49 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	16 "	14 "
Cotton bagging . . . . .	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ cts.	5 cts.	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	4 "
Clothing ready made . . . . .	33 per ct.	55 per ct.	50 per ct.	50 per ct.
Sugar, brown . . . . .	3 cts.	3 cts.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ cts.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ cts.
" white clayed, &c. . . . .	4 "	4 "	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	4 "
" loaf . . . . .	12 "	12 "	12 "	6 "
Cheese . . . . .	9 "	9 "	9 "	9 "
Lard . . . . .	3 "	3 "	3 "	3 "
Lead, pig, bar, &c. . . . .	2 "	3 "	3 "	3 "
Iron nails, cut . . . . .	5 "	5 "	5 "	3 "
" wrought . . . . .	5 "	5 "	5 "	4 "
spikes, . . . . .	4 "	4 "	4 "	3 "
cables, chain, &c. . . . .	3 "	3 "	3 "	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
Blacksmith's hammers and sledges . . . . .	27 $\frac{1}{2}$ per ct.	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	21 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
castings, vessels of . . . . .	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ cts.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
" other . . . . .	1 "	1 "	1 "	1 "
round and Brazier's rods . . . . .	3 "	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	3 "	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
nail and spike rods . . . . .	3 "	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	3 "	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
sheet and hoop . . . . .	3 "	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	3 "	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
bar manufactured by rolling . . . . .	150 cwt.	185 cwt.	150 cwt.	125 cwt.
" manufactured otherwise . . . . .	90 "	1 ct. lb.	90 "	85 "
Salt . . . . .	20 cts.	20 cts.	10 cts.	8 cts.
Glass bottles, black, n by a 1 quart . . . . .	300	300	300	300
" n by a 2 quart . . . . .	250	250	250	400
Window glass, n by a 8 by 10 inches . . . . .	300	300	300	300
" n by a 10 by 12 " . . . . .	350	350	350	350
" above 10 by 12 " . . . . .	400	400	400	400
Shoes and slippers, silk . . . . .	30	30	30	30
" prunelle, and other stuff . . . . .	25	25	25	25
" leather . . . . .	25	25	25	25
" children's . . . . .	15	15	15	15
Boots and bootees . . . . .	150	150	150	125

It will be seen that the Tariff of 1828 is the highest of the four. It has been called "the bill of abominations." Yet Martin Van Buren, Richard M. Johnson, Thos. H. Benton, Mahlon Dickerson, Silas Wright, and James Buchanan—all voted for it. Messrs. Wright and Buchanan also voted for the Tariff of 1842, and twenty of the Loco focos of the House. Indeed, the credit of the bill of 1842 is claimed for these, because, it is said, *their vote carried it*.

It is also said, that the present Tariff will operate as *prohibitory, and diminish revenue*. It is a sufficient answer, to state the facts, that the highest Tariffs we have ever had, have produced the largest revenue, and that every quarter's return of the present Tariff, proves the same thing. These facts are indisputable.

It is moreover said, that a Tariff *enhances prices* of the goods on which it is imposed. Suppose it does, it is a voluntary tax, and in a Tariff like ours, it falls chiefly on the rich. But the thing is false, in application to a judicious Tariff, as the following statement, furnished by the Treasury Department, will show:—

Description of articles.	1816.		1825.		1829.		1832.	
	Price.	Duty.	Price.	Duty.	Price.	Duty.	Price.	Duty.
Braces of 24 bits . . . . .	s. d.	per ct.	s. d.	per ct.	s. d.	per ct.	s. d.	per ct.
Hammers, per doz. . . . .	18 10	20	7 6	25	5	25	5	25
Cupboard locks, per doz. . . . .	12	20	7 2	25	5 4	25	4 2	25
Seeyards, per pair . . . . .	4	20	2 7	25	1 10	25	1 3	25
Hinges, cast butts, per doz. . . . .	4 8	20	2 9	25	1 4	25	1	25
Compasses, rule joint, per doz. . . . .	3 2	20	2 3	25	1 2	25	1 4	25
Carrycombs, per doz. . . . .	4 2	20	3 1	25	2 7	25	1 10	25
	3 10	20	2	25	1 4	25	11	25



The prices under 1816 show the rates before the Tariff of that year; those under 1825 show the effects of the Tariff of 1816; and so on. Like effects were produced by those Tariffs on nearly all kinds of goods subject to increased duty, cotton and woollen fabrics, &c. &c.

The Birmingham Factory of pins, in Connecticut, which, before the Tariff of 1842, was able to turn out a *million a day*, and *undersell* the imported pins, immediately *lowered* the prices *six cents* per pack, *after* the Tariff, which imposes a duty from 20 to 30 per cent, on this article.

The following are from the prices current of domestic goods, at Lowell, Mass., immediately *before* and immediately *after* the Tariff of 1842:

	Cents.	Cents.
Cotton drillings, - - - - before the Tariff,	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	after, 7
“ shirtings, - - - - do.	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	do. 5
“ “ heavy, - - - - do.	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	do. 5 $\frac{3}{4}$
“ sheetings, - - - - do.	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	do. 6
“ “ wide, - - - - do.	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	do. 7 $\frac{3}{4}$
Flannel, - - - - do.	10	do. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$

Woollens of different kinds fell from 12 $\frac{1}{2}$  to 20 per cent.

The Collector of the Customs of New York, Mr. Curtis, in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, of Nov. 23, 1842, gives a long list of prices, *before* and *after* the Tariff, of articles of which an increased duty had been imposed, which proves, that the prices of such articles had in all cases fallen, except on the best brandies—and fallen largely, for the most part.

These facts prove, that a suitable protection of home industry and labor will enable domestic manufacturers to *sell lower*, and that home competition is quite sufficient to secure this end.

Any Tariff, therefore, that is necessary for an adequate revenue, supersedes the necessity of direct taxation, and is an unspeakable blessing to the labor and industry of the country, besides that it lowers the prices of manufactured articles, while the wages of labor, and the staple produce of our own soil, everywhere rise. The farmer gets his goods cheaper, sells his products higher and finds a ready market. By this means a foundation is laid for the re-establishment of a sound currency. It brings in the precious metals, and keeps them here. Accordingly we find, that since the Tariff of 1842, they are flowing in upon us with great increase.

The truth is, we can never have a sound and abundant currency, till the Tariff shall have had a fair and full experiment. For the want of it, our country had been drained of specie. It now flowing back again.

Hence, the re-adjustment of our Tariff regulations, which, by the conditions of former legislation on the subject necessarily devolved on the 27th Congress, was, in fact, of greater importance than the re-establishment of the currency. It was a *sine qua non*—the former being indispensable as a basis of the latter.

The Tariff is necessarily the first step in our return to prosperity. Not an inch can be recovered, but all would be backward and downward still, without it. Hence the importance of the 27th, or Whig Congress, as the opposing party would never have granted this boon to the people but would even now snatch it away, if they should dare.

#### *What we have proved.*

We submit whether the facts we have adduced do not prove, that there has been something *very bad*—in the administration of our Government for a length of years—and that the people in 1840 did not complain without reason, were not roused without cause.

#### *To whom we are indebted.*

To the Whigs of the 27th Congress, laboring under the greatest possible disadvantages by the defection of the Chief Magistrate—or rather by the betrayal of the insincerity of his pretensions and contending with a powerful opposition that conspired with a treacherous Executive to undermine, and defeat them—to the Whigs of that Congress, placed in such circumstances, warring with such difficulties, is the nation indebted for these discoveries and results. There is a GREAT FACT, the DOINGS of the 27th Congress, *demonstrating* what can be accomplished, against such obstacles, in the way of retrenchment and reform, in bringing to light the high crimes of the past, and providing healing measures for the great misfortunes of the country.

#### *What history will record of the 27th Congress.*

It will say—That it was begotten of an injured people, in hope of redress; that it was the most eminent ever assembled in the same place; that the majority of that body were men of honest principles, intent on great reform, so much demanded; that they were born to this great endeavor, shoublings, lived under a cloud, and died grieving, if not lamented; that they had more important business coming before them, and did more, than any other Congress; that what they left undone, was not fault; that they were placed in a position most anomalous, and had to contend with difficulties unparalleled, by the perfidious conduct of the Chief Magistrate; that they came in after a set of men, who many years of a ruinous policy and destructive measures, had broken down the currency, run down the revenue, run down the people, and run down the country; that they were required to build all up in a day; that they performed miracles for the circumstances in which they were placed, introduced reform, and effected large retrenchments, in a Government for a long time not guilty of such work; the contrary; that in fidelity of purpose and vigor of undertaking, they excelled all example of the kind; that they began a great and good work, achieved much of it, and put down a stake in American history, which will be looked to and hung to in all future time, so long as men may be improved.

#### *The Future.*

In 1840 the instincts of a nation in deep distress, were roused for self-preservation, and the triumphed. But *treason*—rank treason snatched victory from the victors. In 1844, the last trial will come, and the weal or woe of this nation will then be settled. There is no other issue. We have only to say to a disappointed, suffering, and half despairing people,—

*Once more unto the breach, dear friends—ONCE MORE.*



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